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Abstract
Little credible evidence exists on the effect of material resources on school quality
in developing countries. This paper studies the impact of non-personnel funding on
educational outcomes exploiting the peculiar way in which these resources are allo-
cated in South Africa. Government funding follows quintiles constructed on the basis
of school poverty scores. This creates discrete jumps in the allocation of funding and
we use a regression discontinuity approach to analyze its effects on school outcomes
at the end of high school. Our results show a small but positive effect of resources on
student throughput during the last years of high school, and on the number of stu-
dents writing the matriculation exam. However, additional resources do not translate
into a higher number of successful exams, leading to an overall negative effect on pass
rates. We suggest that these findings may have to do with schools reacting to the
per-pupil nature of funding.
1 Introduction
There is great interest amongst both academics and policymakers on the type of policies
that ameliorate school quality. School output is typically considered to depend on both
the resources a school has at its disposal (e.g. infrastructure, teachers) as well as on the
management and incentive structures faced by teachers and principals. Whereas most
observers would probably agree that both types of factors matter, the emphasis appears to
be moving towards incentives and management and away from resources (Bruns, Filmer,
and Patrinos (2011)). A consensus seems to be emerging that resources may have a limited
impact on student learning, particularly when distortions in management reduce their
productivity (Hanushek (2006), Kremer and Holla (2009)). This argument is especially
relevant for developing countries where distortions are likely to be more severe.
Nonetheless, the existing evidence on the effect of material resources on student learn-
ing in developing countries remains largely inconclusive. Glewwe, Hanushek, Humpage,
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and Ravina (2011) undertake a thorough review of the literature on school resources and
educational outcomes in developing countries. Interestingly, they differentiate between
empirical studies with and without “credible” identification strategies. Most studies ana-
lyze the effect of specific inputs (such as the amount of teachers, blackboards, computers,
etc.) with contrasting results. Glewwe et al. (2011) conclude that the body of evidence
on each of these inputs remains too low for any strong conclusions.1
Perhaps even more surprisingly, virtually nothing is known on the effect of general non-
personnel school expenditures. In the context of increasing management decentralization,
schools are left to choose how exactly they spend their resources and a key concern for
governments is on the effectiveness of funds transferred to schools. Besides some cross-
country studies that are likely to suffer from confounding factors, only two articles are
cited in Glewwe et al. (2011) as dealing with the effect of these type of resources on
school quality, (Nannyonjo (2007) and Du and Hu (2008)), neither of which uses what
they consider “high quality” identification strategies. A credible identification strategy
is probably important for this question as school resources are likely to be related to
overall performance (e.g. via endogenous success in attracting funds or via government
redistributive motives) and these would confound the “pure” effect of resources on quality.
Partly as a result of the difficulties of estimating these effects from observational data,
the findings from these studies are assessed by Glewwe et al. (2011) as “puzzling”.
A recent paper by Das et al. (2013) does provide credible evidence on the effect of
material non-personnel resources on test scores. These authors report the results from
a randomized experiment in India where schools were assigned a block grant for non-
personnel expenditures. They find a positive effect on test scores. These results, while
extremely valuable, are based on an intervention with some distinct characteristics. The
block grant was restricted to items to be used directly by students. Moreover, the method
of disbursal required schools to make a list of desired items and had the implementing
organization, together with the teacher, buy the items. These requirements may have
prevented funds to be spent in grossly inefficient ways.
This paper evaluates the effect of non-personnel resources on educational outcomes on
the basis of the actual policy for allocating such resources in South Africa. Evaluations
based on existing government programs may offer a more realistic setting for studying the
effect of material resources on student performance in developing countries. The peculiar
manner in which these resources have been allocated since 2007 provides us with what
we believe is a credible identification strategy. Schools are assigned a poverty score that
depends on the socioeconomic characteristics of the surrounding community and divided
into quintiles on the basis of this score. Non-personnel funding is then determined by
the school quintile. Schools in the poorest quintile receive around 800 Rands (∼80 USD)
per pupil, while schools in the remaining quintiles obtain progressively less funding with
schools at the top receiving about 150 Rands per pupil. Funding is therefore discontinuous
in the poverty score at the thresholds determining the quintiles, and we use a regression
discontinuity approach to estimate the effects of resources. Our main outcome variables
are attendance and success in the national test that students take at the end of high
school (matric).
1These questions have also been analyzed within the context of high-income countries. Jackson, John-
son, and Persico (2015) compare the adult outcomes of cohorts that were differentially exposed to school
finance reforms in the U.S. and find a positive effect of increases in per-pupil spending on completed
years of education and wages. Gibbons and Mcnally (2013) review the most recent wave of studies using
quasi-experimental methods. They conclude that resources have an effect, although the range of estimates
of their impact on student outcomes is rather wide. Also, these authors note that the role of resources
may vary across schooling phases–i.e. early years, primary and secondary.
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In addition to having an allocation rule useful for identification, South Africa repre-
sents a particularly interesting case to study with regards to school resources and per-
formance. Inequalities in both variables are massive in the country due to the historical
legacy of discrimination against blacks and in favor of whites. Since the democratic tran-
sition of the first half of the 1990s, some of these inequalities have started to recede,
although they remain very large. For instance, our data shows that in formerly white-
only schools 54% of students obtain university-access pass rates, which compares with
only 15% in formerly African black schools. Understanding the effect of resources on
school outcomes will thus help assess the impact of progressivity in funding allocations
on the “achievement gap” inherited from the past.
Our analysis will also be useful in light of current discussions on the potentially diverse
effect of alternative resources. Cobb-Clark and Jha (2013) argue that different budget
allocations across spending categories have distinct impacts on student achievement. Also,
Glewwe and Kremer (2006) suggest that the political power of teachers might lead to a
resource allocation with too much spending on teachers and too little on non-personnel
inputs, which may result in a higher marginal product for the latter. Our paper can help
inform this debate by adding empirical evidence on the marginal effect of a specific type
of school spending: non-personnel resources.2
We use school-level data for five out of South Africa’s nine provinces, totaling around
3,000 high schools. We have information on poverty scores, quintiles, enrollment by grade,
as well as matric attendance and results. Our data are collected both before and after the
current funding system, which was established in 2006/2007. Information before 2006 is
used to verify the validity of our identification strategy as well as to control for pre-policy
outcomes at the school level.
There are a number of challenges to our empirical approach. First, differences in
funding across the bottom 3 quintiles are shown to be relatively small, leading us to
exclude two of the four discontinuities we could potentially exploit. A second key challenge
is that we generally do not observe overall school resources, but only the amount of funds
provided by the government. This is problematic because high fees can render shocks to
government funding unimportant. In addition, schools might compensate lower transfers
from the government with higher fees. We check the soundness of our approach in light of
these concerns by using more detailed data from one province, Gauteng, where we were
able to obtain information on fees and a proxy for school non-personnel resources. Using
the more detailed data from Gauteng, we find that the cut-off from quintile 3 to 4 is
suitable for our analysis, and we rely exclusively on that jump for identification purposes.
In particular, we find no evidence of fee compensation at that threshold.
We show a positive effect of resources on student throughput from grade 10 to 12.3
Our results, however, provide no evidence of a positive effect of non-personnel resources
on matric pass rates. If anything, the effects are somewhat negative. Taken together,
our findings suggest that resources may have the effect of increasing the retention of
academically weaker students. We speculate this might be a result of the per-pupil nature
of funding, which may create an incentive to keep students past the compulsory level, with
no effect on education quality (as measured by pass rates on the final examination). That
is, we suggest that schools may respond to additional funding by altering their behavior
2It should be noted that there exist other funds at the provincial level in South Africa for capital
upgrading (e.g. new classrooms or facilities). The type of funds on which our paper focuses should
therefore be thought of as both non-personnel and non-capital.
3These are the post-compulsory grades in South Africa. Schooling is mandatory until grade 9 or age
15 (whichever comes first).
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on the incentivized margin (enrollment) but not on the non-incentivized margin (matric
pass).
It is important to note, however, that our results apply to a specific type of schools,
notably secondary schools just above the median of the school poverty distribution. It
is plausible that resources might have a different (and positive) effect in other contexts.
Notably, resources might be more productive in poorer schools (if decreasing returns are
important) and/or in primary schools, where students are younger.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the allocation of non-
personnel funds across South African schools. Section 3 presents our empirical approach.
After describing our data in Section 4, section 5 evaluates the strengths and limitations
of the empirical strategy in our context. Section 6 presents the results while section 7
provides a discussion of the results and concludes.
2 Allocation of non-personnel resources in South Africa
since 2005
Under the apartheid system, school allocations were highly regressive, with white students
receiving substantially more funding than black students (Branson, Kekana, and Lam
(2013)). After the democratic transition, the eradication of these inequalities became
a priority. Salaries of black and white teachers were equalized. A progressive system
for funding non-personnel expenditures was set up in 2000. These funds were meant to
finance running costs of the schools, such as materials, small equipment, small repairs, etc.
The system allowed high level of discretion to the provinces. Most of the funding followed
what was denoted as the quintile system: each province constructed a poverty score
that ordered schools from poorest to richest on the basis of the surrounding community
and the characteristics of the school itself. The quintiles from this score determined the
allocation that each school obtained. Funds assigned to each quintile varied significantly
by province, as well as the amount of non-personnel resources channelled through the
system ((Department of Basic Education, Republic of South Africa, 2003)).
In 2006 the scheme changed. It was observed that poorer provinces were allocating
less resources to education than richer ones and the resulting amounts were considered not
sufficient for certain schools. Therefore, the allocation rule became more centralized. A
quintile system based on poverty scores still remained the basis for funding, but the quin-
tiles were to be at the national, not the provincial level. As a consequence, the poverty
scores were recomputed in a more homogeneous way across provinces. Importantly, the
new scores were not allowed to account for school characteristics to avoid perverse incen-
tives. The variables that formed the base for the poverty score were to be the same across
all provinces: these included income, unemployment, and the level of education/literacy
in the area. The geographic unit of analysis was to be the electoral ward, although some
provinces appear to have used smaller units.4 Note that the provincial departments were
given discretion on the weighting to apply to the various socioeconomic indicators. This,
in addition to the fact that each province used a different scale, makes poverty scores not
directly comparable across provinces. As detailed in the empirical section, poverty scores
are interacted with provincial dummies when fitting the smooth function of the running
variable in the RD model to account for these different scales.
4Wards are not administrative units in South Africa; the level of aggregation was dictated by the
information available in the Census (Garlick (2013)). The national Department of Education provided
each province with socioeconomic data from the 2001 Census.
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The reform of school funding also incorporated a change of the fee policy. Policymakers
wanted to allow free access to school for poorer learners and the quintile system used for
school funding was also used as a basis for fee waiving. Schools in quintiles 1 and 2 were
declared “no fee schools” and therefore were not allowed to charge fees to students. The
higher amount of resources these quintiles received by virtue of the funding system was
considered enough to compensate for the lost fees. Starting in 2008, schools in quintile 3
also began to shift to a no-fee regime on a roll-out basis that varied by province.
For any given year, the government releases guidelines for funding to each quintile
and the provinces decide on the actual disbursements. Wildeman (2008) indicates that
some provinces deviated from the guidelines, although the differences do not appear to be
significant. Figure 1 shows the evolution of funding for each quintile over time (in constant
2008 Rands). Quintiles 1 and 2 received around R700 per learner while the figures for
quintile 4 and 5 are around R400 and R150. Values for all quintiles are relatively constant
except for quintile 3, that increases from 2007 to 2010 from around R500 to R700. The
change for quintile 3 reflects the change in the fee policy, with quintile 3 schools shifting
to a no-fee regime over time. The figure also makes clear that the difference in funding
between quintiles 1 and 2 and (from 2009 onwards) between quintiles 2 and 3 are relatively
small, a point that will be relevant for our analysis below.
3 Empirical approach
We use a regression discontinuity approach to estimate the effect of school resources on
educational outcomes. Since funding jumps at the poverty score thresholds that determine
the quintiles, indicator functions of such jumps should in principle deliver the local causal
effect of funding once we control for a smooth function of the poverty score. In our
data, the quintiles that determine funding do not follow perfectly the poverty score: as
time passes, a number of schools are assigned to different (typically lower) quintiles. The
design is therefore fuzzy and leads us to adopt a standard IV approach using the original
quintile assignment as instrument for resources. In our analysis, outcome and endogenous
variables are averaged over the years 2008 to 2012.
More formally, consider an outcome Yij of school i in province j. Denote the funding
received by each school by Fij and the poverty score associated to each school by sij .
Because poverty scores differ by province, we will fit the smooth function of the poverty
score separately by province, interacting the score with provincial dummies, denoted by
Pj for province j. The equation for the second stage is thus:
Yij = Pjgj(sij) + ρFij + β
′zij + uij (1)
where gj is a flexible function of the poverty score, that is allowed to differ by province,
and zij is a vector of control variables. Notice that ρ, which is our coefficient of interest,
is assumed not to differ by province, so that we obtain one coefficient that aggregates the
effects across the different provinces.
Fij might be correlated with uij because schools may succeed in attracting funds
depending on political connections or general characteristics themselves linked with the
performance of the school. For this reason, we instrument Fij with an indicator function
that captures the original quintile assignment on the basis of the poverty score. If poverty
scores were constructed using technical considerations, as argued above, the initial assign-
ment (and therefore government funding) should be random around the threshold that
determines quintile jumps. For reasons to be detailed below, our analysis is based on just
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one discontinuity, from quintile 3 to 4 and we focus on that discontinuity alone here. The
indicator function taking value one for schools assigned to quintile 3 or less (as opposed
to 4 or more) is denoted by F34ij . Our first stage is thus:
Fij = Pjhj(sij) + ρF34ij + γ
′zij + vij (2)
We estimate these equations by 2SLS. If no variable relevant for the outcome Y jumps
at the threshold defining the original quintile assignment F34ij , the error term uij will be
uncorrelated with the predictions of the first stage and ρ will be consistently estimated.
Because the poverty score is computed on the basis of geographical features, it is spatially
correlated, and so are likely to be the outcomes we consider. We thus cluster our standard
errors at the magisterial district level, a unit larger than the ward which typically served
as the basis for the computation of poverty scores. There are 239 magisterial districts in
our sample containing an average of 13 schools.
We estimate different specifications of these equations using alternative windows around
the threshold for the jump from quintile 3 to 4. The poverty score is centered around this
threshold and standardized by dividing it by its standard deviation. The specifications
we use are a polynomial of degree 3 for gj(sij) with a window of ±1.5 standard deviations,
and a linear specification with a smaller window (±0.5) that allows for different slopes
at either side of the threshold. Our benchmark specifications control for the apartheid-
period school classification and indicators for quintile jumps other than the one of interest
from quintile 3 to 4.5 We also perform analyses with and without pre-2007 outcomes as
controls.
The key challenge of the analysis is that we are interested in the effect of school re-
sources but we only observe funding from the government. Specifically, we do not observe
the fees charged by the school. This is problematic for several reasons. First, if govern-
ment funding is only a minor component of school resources, differences in this type of
funding will be practically insignificant. Secondly, schools may compensate lower govern-
ment funding with higher fees. If this were the case, schools at either side of the quintile
threshold would have smaller or no differences in resources compared to government fund-
ing alone, and this would bias our estimates towards zero. In addition, differences in fees
at either side of the threshold could threaten the validity of our approach, since they
would lead to a violation of the key assumption that F34ij is uncorrelated with the er-
ror term uij after controlling for a smooth function of the poverty score. In particular,
differences in fees could imply that schools at either side of the threshold are different to
start with, possibly through changes in the pool of students. We address these issues in
section 5 below, after introducing the data in the following section.
4 Data
We use school level administrative data on five out of South Africa’s nine provinces: West-
ern Cape, Gauteng, Northern Cape, Eastern Cape and Kwazulu-Natal. These were the
provinces from which we were able to obtain school poverty scores. The data come from
different sources and have been merged by the authors. Poverty scores come from either
the provincial Department of Education or from provincial Gazettes. They refer to the
5Some schools fall in quintiles other than 3 and 4 in the specifications with a large window. Omitting
indicators for these other quintile jumps makes the first stage fit problematic for these specifications,
since resources do change substantially at these other jumps. We thus include these indicators in all our
regressions, although this makes no difference for our results beyond the first stage.
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years 2005 (Western Cape), 2006 (Eastern Cape), 2007 (Gauteng) and 2008 (Kwazulu-
Natal and Northern Cape). These data have been merged with two administrative and
freely available datasets on basic school characteristics. The first dataset is the national
Department of Basic Education (DBE) EMIS information system, which provides data on
school quintiles for different years and on the former apartheid-era school categorization
(whether the school belonged to a white area, or an african black township, etc.).6 The
second dataset is the SNAP survey, a school level survey with information on enrollment
levels by grade for different years.7 In addition, these datasets have been merged with
information on matric results obtained from the DBE. These include the number of stu-
dents writing the exam and those passing for each school. All variables are available from
2008 to 2012. We also have enrollment data from 2003 to 2005 and matric information
for 2005. Our analytical sample only includes schools for which we have information on
all years, which are a large majority of them (83%).
For one province, Gauteng, we obtained additional data from the provincial Depart-
ment of Education, which we use to assess the robustness of our approach to a number
of identification threats. The additional information for Gauteng includes the govern-
ment non-personnel funding received by the school and, crucially, fee amounts at the
school level.8 Moreover, the data from Gauteng contain information on the number of
computers in the school as well as on the race composition of the student body. We
use these variables as imperfect proxies of material resources owned by the school and
students’ socioeconomic status, respectively. Unfortunately, the available information is
not constant across all years, so we use different subsamples in alternative estimations.
In particular, fee information is available from 2008 to 2012, except for 2010. Information
on the number of computers is available only from 2010 to 2012.
For the general dataset with all provinces, our funding variable is the amount of funds
to be assigned to each school–on the basis of its quintile and province–as stated in the
provincial official documents. It is important to note that this is based on the allocations
that schools are supposed to obtain on the basis of the quintile reported in our data,
not on the money they actually obtain. There are two possible sources of measurement
error on this variable. First, the provincial documents and/or our quintile data could
contain mistakes. In order to check for this possibility, we use the Gauteng data on
the allocations to individual schools, which we have for 2008 and 2009. The correlation
between the official Gauteng record and our funding variable is 0.90, suggesting that the
extent of measurement error in this respect is fairly low. A second potential source of
error may result from leakages in government disbursements, which would imply that
schools receive less funding than they are entitled to. Reinikka and Svensson (2004)
provide an example of this problem in Uganda. However, South Africa has a significantly
better record of accountability in government expenses compared to other countries in
the region. Also, since the information on the amount schools should receive is publicly
available, this would not appear to be a major concern in our setting.
We take as treatment for time t the average funding from the three years prior to t.
This is because funding for learning is cumulative and funding at t−1 ought to contribute
6see http://www.education.gov.za/EMIS/tabid/57/Default.aspx
7See https://www.datafirst.uct.ac.za/dataportal/index.php/catalog/482
8A problem with the fee variable in the Gauteng data is the difficulty in distinguishing missing values
from zeros. It seems that schools that charge no fees appear in the data with the fee variable missing.
There are virtually no schools with fees coded as zero. In contrast, for instance in 2009, 97% of schools
in quintiles 1 and 2, which were not allowed to charge fees, have the fee variable missing. As a further
confirmation of this assumption, the richest quintile (Q5) only has 5% of the schools with missing fees.
We thus replace missing values with zeros in our sample.
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to learning as much as funding at t.9 The funding variable is expressed in R100s. This is
the order of magnitude of the observed jumps in funding across quintiles and thus makes
our IV estimates more comparable to the reduced form estimates.
Regarding our outcome variables, we focus on matric pass rates as well as on student
throughput. The simple pass rate–i.e. the number of student passing the exam over those
writing it–may not be the best measure of school performance. It is in fact possible that
schools discourage low-achieving students from writing the test as a result of the emphasis
placed on matric pass rates in a variety of accountability processes.10 For this reason, we
also use as an outcome variable the number of student passing the examination relative
to the number of pupils in grade 10 two years earlier. The other outcome variables are
the student throughput from grade 10 to 12 and the ratio of students writing the matric
exam relative to both grade 12, and to grade 10 two years earlier.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of our sample by quintile. We have from 500
to 700 high schools per quintile.11 As expected, the poorest schools are in the provinces of
the Eastern Cape and Kwazulu-Natal, many of which belonged to the “homelands” under
the apartheid regime. At the opposite extreme, in quintile 5, schools are predominantly
White (and to a lesser extent Indian and Coloured) according to the old classification
system. Quintiles 3 and 4 are more mixed, containing a significant number of township
schools and with a more even distribution across all provinces (except Northern Cape,
which is sparsely populated and has fewer schools in any quintile).
Table 1 also shows the treatment values as well as pre- and post-treatment outcomes.
The treatment (government funding averaged between 2008 and 2012) indeed decreases
with the quintile, showing small differences between quintile 1 to 3 and larger jumps be-
tween 3 to 5. Almost all pre- and post-treatment variables (notably pass rates) increase
by quintile, suggesting that poverty scores do reflect factors harmful for school progression
and learning. Most patterns are clearly convex in quintile, with a particularly sharp dif-
ference between quintile five and the rest. This is consistent with expectations, reflecting
the historical legacy of discrimination in South Africa and much in line with a variety
of other socioeconomic outcomes (Leibbrandt, Woolard, Finn, and Argent (2010)). The
throughput and pass rates for all quintiles, except the fifth, imply that during the period
under analysis less than a third of students enrolled in grade 10 successfully completed
matric two years later.
5 Validity of the approach
This section addresses potential concerns with our empirical approach before proceeding
to the results. We start by addressing the concerns associated to not observing overall
school resources in our data. We do this by providing evidence on schools in the Gauteng
province for which we have additional information. We then use our main dataset from all
provinces to assess the first stage of our model and to focus on the basic RD assumptions
of no manipulation of the running variable and of no jump at the relevant threshold
exhibited by pre-determined variables.
9The results are not affected by using funding for time t only.
10Borkum (2012) also notes the possibility of “conscious gate keeping whereby schools block the pro-
gression of weak students at grade 10 in order to avoid having them eventually take the matric exams in
grade 12” (p.376).
11The uneven number of schools across quintiles results from the under/over-representation of the five
provinces in our sample in different quintiles.
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5.1 Fees and government funding
As mentioned above, the key challenge to our approach is that we cannot observe over-
all school resources, but only government funding. To explore the implications of this
limitation for our analysis, we use data from the Gauteng province. These data include
information on fees and material resources such as computers. We first assess whether
jumps in government funding are economically significant and, secondly, whether it ap-
pears that fees are used to compensate for the discrete jump in funding. Since these issues
apply to all schools and not only to secondary schools, we increase our sample size by
using all schools in the province, although we also report results using secondary schools
only.
Figure 2 shows average school fees by poverty score in Gauteng. The left panel includes
all schools while the right panel considers only secondary schools. Each dot in the figure
corresponds to the average from 2008 to 2012 (excluding 2010, for which no data is
available) for the schools with a given poverty score. On average, each poverty score
includes around 40 schools in the left panel and 12 high schools in the right panel. Vertical
lines show the different quintile cutoffs. Richer schools (in higher quintiles) appear at low
levels of the poverty score on the left side of the distributions.
There are two important messages from Figure 2. First, fees at richer schools are
so large that dwarf any non-personnel government funding. While pupils in quintile 5
schools pay around 6000 Rand (∼ 600 USD) per year, non-personnel government funding
in these schools is less than 200 Rands (∼ 20 USD) per pupil. This is also true around
the threshold between quintile 4 and 5. This implies that the change in government
funding at that threshold may be barely noticeable for the schools concerned, rendering
that jump less attractive for identification purposes. Second, the figure shows how fees
decrease very rapidly with poverty scores for quintile 4 schools, leading to no discernible
differences in fees for schools at the right boundary of quintile 4 compared to schools
at the left end of quintile 3. This, together with the very limited jumps in government
funding upon crossing quintiles 1 to 3 documented above, indicates that the only jump
with potential for identifying the impact of school resources is the one from quintile 3 to 4.
This threshold appears particularly promising for our purposes since the poorest schools
in quintile 4 charge very low fees (close to zero) as do the richest schools in quintile three,
but receive significantly more government funding.
To formally assess the extent to which overall resources change upon crossing the dif-
ferent quintile thresholds, we add fees and government funding for each school to construct
a measure of overall resources that can be used for running non-personnel expenditures.
We then estimate the first stage in equation 2, separately for each jump. Table 2 shows
the results. The first column considers all schools and uses a 3rd order polynomial and a
relatively large window (1.5 standard deviations) around the cutoff. The second column
uses a linear function with spline and a smaller window around the threshold (0.5 standard
deviations). Columns 3 and 4 replicate the same estimations using only high schools. As
expected, the only coefficients that are consistently large and statistically significant are
those for the jump from quintiles three to four.12 Coefficients are in the order of 0.4 when
all schools are used and slightly lower when only high schools are considered. This im-
plies that quintile 3 schools close to this threshold obtain, on average, around 40 percent
more resources than those at the other side of the threshold. This amount is thus both
statistically and economically significant. As an illustration, Figure 3 shows the jump in
12The only other statistically significant estimate is a negative coefficient at the 2 to 3 threshold in
column 1. However the estimate is not stable across specifications and appears on the whole to be both
economically and statistically insignificant.
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log total resources upon crossing the different quintile thresholds fitting a linear function
allowed to vary by quintile. Each dot in the figure again corresponds to the average of
log resources for the schools with a given poverty score. The picture clearly shows that
only the jump from 3 to 4 represents a genuine increase in overall resources.
Table 3 explores in more detail the jump in resources from quintile three to four in
Gauteng. Different rows correspond to different outcome variables while the columns
correspond to different specifications (and to using all schools as opposed to high schools)
as in the previous table. For reference purposes, the first row reproduces the results of
Table 2, using the log of total resources as outcome variable. We wish to assess if the jump
in total resources posited by our administrative data is translated into a detectable jump in
material resources owned by the school. The second row in the table thus uses computers
per learner at the school as outcome variable. While there seems to be an increase in
computers per learner upon crossing the threshold when considering all schools, no jump
is discernible when using only high schools. This need not invalidate our approach because
there can be reasons why high schools may not spend marginal resources on computers,
but given that our analysis will focus on high schools, the fact that no jump in computers
is apparent in these schools does raise questions on alternative uses of government funding
and thus provide a word of caution when interpreting our results.
The third row in Table 3 uses as outcome variable average fees, in Rands, in order to
test whether schools compensate lower government funding with higher fees at this thresh-
old. Coefficients are generally small and never significant suggesting that the phenomenon
of fee compensation is not so relevant for the schools we are considering.13 To further
probe into this issue, the fourth row in the table considers whether the demographic pro-
file of the student body jumps at the threshold. If schools do raise fees when receiving
less government funding, we should observe a higher proportion of low-income students
on the quintile 3 side. Because African blacks remain the poorest population group in
South Africa, we use as (imperfect) proxy for the socioeconomic status of the student
body, the proportion of African blacks among students in the post-treatment period. As
shown in the table, there is no jump in this variable upon crossing the threshold. All in
all, the patterns displayed in the bottom two rows of Table 3 do not seem to indicate that
schools compensate lower government funding with higher fees.
In sum, the data from Gauteng provide us with valuable guidance regarding the va-
lidity of our approach. The jump from quintile three to four appears promising in the
sense that it displays a substantial change of resources (although for high schools it does
not translate into a higher number of computers). Moreover, fees at the schools around
that threshold are close to zero and, indeed, we do not observe evidence of higher fees
compensating lower government funds in these schools. We will thus proceed with our
analysis for all provinces focusing on the jump from quintile 3 to 4 and using government
funding as the endogenous variable.
5.2 First stage
Table 4 shows the jump in government funding from quintile four to three using all
provinces. The first row considers the jump in the actual quintile. If quintiles followed
the poverty score perfectly, the coefficient for this variable would be minus one. In our
data the estimated coefficient is around -0.66, showing that about one third of schools
13If anything, the coefficients are mostly positive, which would be the opposite of fee compensation.
However, the estimates are somewhat unstable, possibly as a result of the fast exponential decline in fees
in the relevant range (logs are not used because of the large amount of zeros).
10
had their quintile reassigned relative to the original placement.
The second row uses as outcome our endogenous variable: government funding aver-
aged over the previous three years. The jump from quintile four to three generates almost
200 additional Rands per pupil from the government. In log terms this implies an increase
of around 0.35 to 0.4 points, very similar to the magnitudes observed for the jump in log
income from the Gauteng data. This is reassuring and it strengthens the idea that fees
do not appear to be very relevant for schools at this margin. The last rows in the table
show that this result applies to different years. The increase is smaller for the last year of
the sample period, indicating that schools have increasingly seen their assigned quintile
recategorized over time.
5.3 Poverty score manipulation
In the process of designing the new poverty scores in 2005/2006, schools were allowed
to contest their assigned poverty score. This introduces a risk of manipulation in our
running variable. Wildeman (2008) documents findings from anonymous interviews with
provincial officials involved in the creation of poverty scores. He reports that lobbying was
quite limited in most provinces and that ad hoc adjustments were only made for schools
near the boundaries of electoral wards (to account for possible discrepancies between
the students’ socioeconomic characteristics and those of the electoral ward). Garlick
(2013) notes that the number of schools to be treated was chosen after the poverty scores
had already been assigned, so that precise manipulation of the poverty scores in the
neighborhood of quintile thresholds was not possible. It is also apparent from the first
stage results above that provinces amended the initial quintile assignments for a significant
number of schools over time, suggesting that much tampering was done ex-post. For
these reasons, manipulation during the early poverty score assignments (our instrument)
appears unlikely, although it cannot be completely ruled out, particularly for Kwazulu-
Natal and Northern Cape for which our poverty score variable dates from 2008.
We thus follow standard practice in RD designs and check if there is a higher density of
schools at the beneficial side of our threshold of interest (i.e. the quintile 3 side) relative to
the costly side (the quintile 4 side). If schools have successfully manipulated poverty scores
to their advantage we would expect such asymmetry. Figure 4 shows the distribution of
poverty scores for schools in the neighborhood of the quintile 3 to 4 jump. There is no
indication of an unusual amount of schools at the rightward side of the threshold, which
corresponds to quintile 3, relative to the leftward side. This suggests that manipulation
of poverty scores should not be particularly concerning for our analysis.
5.4 Balance at different sides of the threshold
The critical assumption of our approach is that no variable relevant for school performance
jumps at the quintile threshold (aside from non-personnel funding). Having addressed the
possibility that fees may jump at the threshold, we now consider the question in a more
general way, checking whether pre-treatment outcomes (i.e. outcomes before the current
quintile system was introduced) are discontinuous at the threshold. If our approach is
valid, the poverty score threshold determining quintiles ought to have been meaningless
prior to the establishment of the current system and variables predating 2007 should not
increase at that threshold.
Table 5 shows the jumps in pre-treatment outcomes at the 3 to 4 quintile cutoff. As
in the previous table, each row corresponds to an outcome variable and each column to a
different specification: either 3rd order polynomial with large window or linear with spline
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and small window. All regressions correspond to the “reduced form” where outcomes are
directly regressed on the instrument. The first variable considered is the school quintile as
it was in 2005. As mentioned above, poverty scores and quintiles existed and determined
funding already before 2006, but they were calculated in a very different way. Our first
goal is thus to test whether the former poverty score system generated a quintile jump
in the same ‘neighborhood’ as the current one. As it is clear from the table, this is not
the case, suggesting that the current quintile thresholds were indeed meaningless before
2007. The following rows use as outcome variables the pre-treatment outcomes. No
coefficient is significantly different from zero at conventional levels in either specification.
It appears that treatment groups are indeed “balanced” regarding factors relevant for
school performance, and this suggests that our approach of focusing on the 3 to 4 quintile
threshold is valid.
6 RD estimates
Table 6 shows the main results of our exercise: the estimates of the change in school
outcomes upon crossing from quintile four to three. Column 1 shows the 3rd order poly-
nomial specification with baseline controls (quintile jump indicator functions other than
the one from 3 to 4, and Apartheid-era education department). Column 2 uses the same
specification but adds the pre-2007 outcome as a further control. Columns 3 and 4 repli-
cate the same models but use a linear specification with spline for the smooth function of
the poverty score.
The first relevant result from table 6 is that coefficients are relatively small. No
coefficient is larger than 0.025, suggesting that the increase of about 200 Rands in funding
per pupil resulting from the jump from quintile 4 to 3 (approximately 30 to 45 percent)
has little impact on student outcomes. The second important result is that there are
no positive effects of funding on the pass rate, a common indicator of education quality
in the literature and a widely-used measure of high school performance in South Africa.
Actually, the coefficients for matric pass rates appear to be quite reliably negative when
using grade 12 enrollment as the basis for the ratio (row 4). The estimates are virtually
zero when grade 10 enrollment is used in the denominator (row 6). This discrepancy
appears to be driven by the positive effect of funding on student throughput from grade
10 to grade 12 (row 2) and, to a lesser extent, by the positive impact on writing the matric
exam (row 5). At the same time, no discernible effect is apparent on grade 10 enrollment
(row 1). In short, additional non-personnel funding appears to have no impact on grade
10 enrollment but increases throughput from grade 10 to 12. The increase in throughput,
however, does not translate into higher pass rates.
It is worth noting that these results are quite robust across specifications, with co-
efficients being relatively stable regardless of the polynomial/window used and whether
pre-treatment outcomes are controlled for or not. The fact that the pre-treatment out-
comes do not significantly affect the main coefficients provides a further assurance that the
sample is indeed balanced on the pre-reform characteristics as discussed in the previous
section.
7 Discussion
What can we make of the results shown in Table 6? One possible explanation is that
schools react to the per-pupil nature of the funding policy, which increases the incentive
to retain students past the compulsory grade/age. They may do this, for example, by
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being more lenient in allowing students to progress across grades.14 This would explain
the positive effect of funds on throughput from grade 10 to 12. To the extent that these
‘marginal’ students would have dropped out in the absence of additional funding, this
may also explain the negative effect of resources on pass rates for grade 12 enrollees.
One can assume that, at the drop-out margin, students are below average in terms of
academic preparedness, which would be consistent with the zero effect of funding on pass
rates when grade 10 is used as the basis for the ratio.
Our results rest on the assumption that no fee compensation takes place at the quin-
tile 3 to 4 threshold. We corroborate this assumption with evidence from the Gauteng
province. To the extent that this may not hold for the other provinces in the data, lower
fees and the consequent increased access for poorer students may produce observationally
equivalent results–i.e. positive effect on enrollment along with negative effect on pass
rates. Although we cannot test the absence of fee compensation in other provinces, we
note that our data show no increase in enrollment at grade 10 for treated schools. We
believe this renders the alternative interpretation less plausible, as there are few reasons
to believe that cheaper schooling would result in higher throughput to grade 12 but not
in higher enrollment at grade 10 (which is the first year of non-compulsory schooling in
South Africa).15
Taken together, our results raise doubts on the effectiveness of non-personnel funding
in improving school outcomes in our setting. Although additional years of schooling
are generally considered to be beneficial for youth, irrespective of final graduation, the
South African literature on returns to education reports virtually no earnings returns to
completing grades 10 and 11 (Keswell and Poswell (2004)). This would imply little or
no positive effect of the funding policy on students outcomes through additional years
of education. Moreover, the ‘marginal’ students who benefit from more years at school
may be significantly different from the inframarginal students, leading to the possibility
of negative externalities from changes in class size and peer composition.16
Nonetheless, we note that it would be inappropriate to conclude from our results that
providing material resources to relatively poor schools, in contexts such as the one in South
Africa, cannot and generally does not improve learning. In particular, our results regard
the effects of a R200 (∼20 USD) increase in per-pupil resources for secondary schools
around the quintile 3-4 threshold. There are three major reasons why resources in other
contexts could have a positive effect on learning. First, non-personnel resources may have
a differential impact on school quality at different parts of the poverty score distribution.
For instance, the productivity of additional inputs may be higher in the bottom quintile
where the lack of resources is more severe and the baseline quality indicators are lower.
Second, results could be different for primary schools where students, by virtue of being
younger, may be more amenable to acquire additional cognitive skills (Heckman (2000)).
Third, learning may be non-linear in resources. It is possible that complementarities
between material inputs and indivisibilities imply that larger increases in resources have
a proportionally higher impact than smaller increases.
14Gustafsson (2011) shows that failing a grade is one of the main correlates of student drop-out
past grade 9 in South Africa. As mentioned above, there have been reports of conscious control of
the progression of weak students at grade 10 (Borkum (2012)). The incentives of school principals
and government officials with respect to student grade progression have also been noted in the media
(http://mg.co.za/article/2011-03-11-matric-quality-vs-quantity).
15The absence of an effect on student enrollment at grade 10 is also at odds with the possibility that
our results reflect a migration from untreated to treated schools in response to lower fees or a change in
the perceived quality of education due to the increased available resources.
16We are grateful to Rob Garlick for pointing out these possibilities to us.
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Having said this, while our paper does not conclusively show that “resources do not
matter” it does provide cautionary evidence regarding the potential for material resources
to close achievement gaps such as the one observed in South Africa. In addition, our paper
highlights the possibility that funding disbursed on a per-pupil basis may alter incentives
on the subsidized margin.
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Figure 1: Evolution of per pupil funding by quintile
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics by quintile
Variables Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Size
N Schools 550.00 536.00 754.00 520.00 446.00
Apartheid Department
townships 0.10 0.16 0.32 0.30 0.04
coloured 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.25 0.14
homeland 0.68 0.64 0.48 0.18 0.02
indian 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.18
natal 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03
new 0.14 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.01
white 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.57
Province
EC 0.31 0.30 0.39 0.17 0.16
GT 0.04 0.08 0.13 0.26 0.39
KZ 0.61 0.56 0.39 0.38 0.32
NC 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01
WC 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.17 0.11
Pre-treatment
log Grade 10 4.80 4.97 5.09 5.16 5.14
Throughput Grades 10-12 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.65
Matric attendance rate 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.97
Matric pass rate 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.66 0.83
Matric attendance rate over Grade 10 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.59
Matric pass rate over Grade 10 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.33 0.51
Treatment
Gov funding in R100s 7.47 6.97 6.57 3.84 1.60
Post-treatment
log Grade 10 4.73 4.75 5.01 5.31 5.20
Throughput Grades 10-12 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.53 0.72
Matric attendance rate 0.85 0.87 0.89 0.91 0.95
Matric pass rate 0.59 0.62 0.62 0.74 0.89
Matric attendance rate over Grade 10 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.69
Matric pass rate over Grade 10 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.37 0.63
Apartheid department refers to the government department managing different types of schools under
Apartheid. The figures in these rows refer to the distribution of schools in different departments for a given
quintile. Failure of the rows to sum up to one comes from missing values. Figures for treatment related
variables correspond to the average in each quintile. Pretreatment variables refer to either 2005 (for matric
variables) or to the average between 2003 and 2005 (for enrollment related variables). Posttreatment
variables refer to the average between 2008 to 2012.
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Figure 2: Average fees by poverty score, Gauteng province
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Table 2: Change in log total resources at different quintile jumps, Gauteng province
1 2 3 4
Indicator Jump 4-5 -0.016 -0.041 0.16 0.13
(0.121) (0.124) (0.15) (0.15)
Indicator Jump 3-4 0.439 0.423 0.375 0.384
(0.026)*** (0.028)*** (0.052)*** (0.051)***
Indicator Jump 2-3 -0.139 -0.015 -0.142 -0.067
(0.039)*** (0.021) (0.087) (0.081)
Indicator Jump 1-2 -0.0023 -0.029 0.089 0.102
(0.0381) (0.055) (0.101) (0.095)
Sample All schools All schools Secondary schools Secondary schools
Poly.order 3 0 3 0
spline 0 1 0 1
N 826 241 213 57
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Signif. codes: 0.01 ‘***’ 0.05 ‘**’ 0.1 ‘*’. Coefficients from
regressions corresponding to the reduced form from equations (1) and (2). Each coefficient corresponds
to a separate regression where the outcome is always log total resources (fees+government non-personnel
funding) and the instrument is the indicator functions for the corresponding jump in the row. The first
two columns use all schools and the last two use only secondary schools. For each type of school, the first
column uses a large window of 1.5 sd around the threshold, and the second column uses a small window
of 0.5 sd with spline.
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Figure 3: Log Total Resources by poverty score, Gauteng province
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Table 3: Change in resource-related indicators at jump 3-4, Gauteng Province
1 2 3 4
log total resources 0.439 0.423 0.375 0.384
(0.026)*** (0.028)*** (0.052)*** (0.051)***
PCs per student 0.0117 0.007 -0.00061 -0.0038
(0.0032)*** (0.003)** (0.00552) (0.0050)
Fees 54.76 -97.17 250.17 75.22
(158.59) (120.66) (225.06) (94.51)
Percent African Black 0.0041 0.0083 0.0091 0.016
(0.0117) (0.0138) (0.0190) (0.024)
Sample All schools All schools Secondary schools Secondary schools
Poly.order 3 0 3 0
spline 0 1 0 1
N 1637 922 484 254
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Signif. codes: 0.01 ‘***’ 0.05 ‘**’ 0.1 ‘*’. Coefficients from
regressions corresponding to the reduced form from equations (1) and (2). Each row uses a different
outcome variable. PCs per student refer to the years 2010 to 2012. Fees refer to the years 2008 to 2012,
except for 2010. The first two columns use all schools and the last two use only secondary schools. For
each type of school, the first column uses a large window of 1.5 sd around the threshold, and the second
column uses a small window of 0.5 sd with spline.
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Gov funding 1.803 1.89
(0.099)*** (0.11)***
log Gov funding 0.356 0.391
(0.024)*** (0.025)***
log Gov funding 2008 0.498 0.472
(0.031)*** (0.035)***
log Gov funding 2010 0.439 0.479
(0.035)*** (0.033)***





Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Signif. codes: 0.01 ‘***’ 0.05 ‘**’ 0.1 ‘*’. Coefficients from
regressions corresponding to the first stage from equation (2). The first row uses school quintile as
outcome, while the remaining rows use different government funding variables. The first column uses a
large window of 1.5 sd around the threshold, and the second column uses a small window of 0.5 sd with
spline.
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Figure 4: Check of manipulation of running variable: Distribution of schools around the
threshold, all provinces
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Table 5: Balance of pretreatment variables around jump 3-4, all provinces
1 2
Quintile 2005 predet -0.025 -0.11
(0.100) (0.12)
log Grade 10 predet -0.051 -0.018
(0.058) (0.067)
Throughput Grades 10-12 predet 0.015 0.025
(0.019) (0.024)
Matric attendance rate predet -0.0081 0.0046
(0.0114) (0.0139)
Matric pass rate predet -0.032 -0.028
(0.022) (0.023)
Matric attendance rate over Grade 10 predet -0.0016 0.010
(0.0209) (0.023)






Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Signif. codes: 0.01 ‘***’ 0.05 ‘**’ 0.1 ‘*’. Coefficients from
regressions corresponding to the reduced form from equations (1) and (2). Each row uses a different
outcome variable. Outcomes are different predetermined variables, measured before the establishment
of the new quintile system in 2006/7. The quintile variable and matric related variables refer to 2005.
Enrollment variables use the average from 2003 to 2005. The first column uses a large window of 1.5 sd
around the threshold, and the second column uses a small window of 0.5 sd with spline.
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Table 6: IV results of post-treatment outcomes for jump 3-4, all provinces
1 2 3 4
log Grade 10 post -0.016 0.0084 -0.0082 0.00038
(0.034) (0.0186) (0.0371) (0.02238)
Throughput Grades 10-12 post 0.024 0.021 0.022 0.0160
(0.012)** (0.011)** (0.012)* (0.0096)*
Matric attendance rate post -0.0028 -0.0017 -0.0026 -0.0032
(0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037)
Matric pass rate post -0.0195 -0.0134 -0.0224 -0.0182
(0.0094)** (0.0083) (0.0095)** (0.0086)**
Matric attendance rate over Grade 10 post 0.018 0.019 0.015 0.0149
(0.010)* (0.009)** (0.011) (0.0092)
Matric pass rate over Grade 10 post 0.000054 0.0023 -0.0025 -0.0021
(0.008532) (0.0058) (0.0090) (0.0062)
Estimation IV IV IV IV
Poly.order 3 3 0 0
spline 0 0 1 1
N 2163 2138 866 852
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Signif. codes: 0.01 ‘***’ 0.05 ‘**’ 0.1 ‘*’. Coefficients from
regressions corresponding to the IV from equations (1) and (2). Each row uses a different outcome
variable measured after the new quintile system was established in 2006/7. Variables are measured as
averages from 2008 to 2012. The first two columns use a large window of 1.5 sd around the threshold,
and the second two columns use a small window of 0.5 sd with spline. For each of these windows, the
second column adds as further control the corresponding pretreatment outcome (ex. 2005 matric pass
rate in row 4).
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